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ATIN America is not the largest recipient of foreign investment in
the world. In 2004, out of $648 billion of the world's flow of For-
eign Direct Investment (FDI), Latin America attracted $67 bil-
lion,1 only 10.3 percent.2 Yet the majority of arbitration cases filed by
investors against states have had a Latin American country as a defen-
dant. In 2006, out of 106 pending cases at the International Center for
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1. U.N. Conference On Trade And Development [UNCTAD], World Investment Re-
port 2005, 63, fig.II.12, available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2005-en.pdf
(last visited July 20, 2006) [hereinafter UNCTAD World Investment Report 2005].
2. Id. The data comprises Greenfield FDI and mergers and acquisitions. It does not
cover portfolio investments represented in speculative investments where the in-
vestor is not involved in management of the investment. The data only relates to
investment received by countries also known as inflow and does not represent the
amount of outflow investment, that is investments sourced from a country differ-
ent from the recipient. In 2004 the amount of outflow investment in the world was
$730 billion. Most of that amount was sourced from developed countries. Outflow
FDI from Latin America amounted to $10 billion during that year.
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Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), sixty cases have been filed
against Latin American countries.3 Likewise, it is estimated that there
are around fifty-four non-ICSID investor-state arbitration cases, of which
a large portion have a Latin American country as a defendant. 4
One should wonder about the causes of this disparity. At first sight
Latin American countries do not seem to treat investors worse than other
countries. Why then has there been a surge of investment arbitrations?
One possible explanation is the Argentine economic crisis that hit local
and foreign investors alike and forced the government to devalue the cur-
rency, change the conditions of concession agreements, and freeze the
prices of utilities and services. 5 But had there not been an international
instrument that provided for the possibility of investors initiating arbitra-
tion cases directly against the states, none of the cases would have been
possible.
So, the questions then turn to these international law instruments: why
have countries entered into these instruments? Have they obtained what
they were looking for? Is the moment appropriate for a judgment of
those instruments? Should Latin American countries continue the path
signaled by international investment law?
This article is divided into five parts and deals with the issues afore-
mentioned. The first part deals with the general framework of foreign
investment; it refers to the concept of investment arbitration. The next
part deals with the rationale of the parties in international investment
law. The next section refers to the evolution of international investment
arbitration in Latin America. Next, the article highlights the impact in-
vestment arbitration has had in Latin America. The last part deals with
the conclusions and recommendations.
II. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
International investment arbitration is an alternative dispute resolution
mechanism whereby foreign investors are entitled to settle disputes di-
rectly, without the intervention of intermediaries, with the host states. It
is but one of the instruments provided by international investment law to
protect investments internationally.6 As per this mechanism, foreign in-
3. International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), Pending
Cases, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pending.htm (last visited July 20,
2006). See also U.N. Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], Note by
the UNCTAD Secretariat: Issues Related to International Arrangements, Investor-
State Disputes and Policy Implications, U.N. Doc. TD/B/COM.2/62 (Jan. 14, 2005),
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2d62-en.pdf.
4. Id.
5. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], Occasional Note: Inter-
national Investment Disputes on the Rise, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIT/
2004/2 (Nov. 29, 2004), available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/
webiteiit20042-en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD Occasional Note]. Accordingly, as of
July 2006, Argentina was a defendant in forty-two ICSID arbitration cases.
6. Other instruments are non-commercial risk insurance and standards of treatment
under international agreements. See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d. ed. 2004) (1994).
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vestors, either under the form of corporations or as individuals, can pre-
sent claims in an international and neutral forum against countries where
they have conducted business, when the conditions are satisfied.
When foreign investors operate under the form of a corporation, many
issues can be involved. For example, if the foreign investor has conducted
business in the host country under the form of a corporation incorporated
in the home country and a dispute has arisen, the arbitration could be
filed by that entity that would be considered a foreign corporation. But
the situation might be different when the foreign investor undertook ac-
tivities in the host country under the form of a wholly owned subsidiary
registered therein. That entity might not qualify as a foreign investor, but
rather as a local investor not entitled to international protection. 7
From the business point of view of the foreign investor, the wholly
owned subsidiary incorporated in the host country might not be consid-
ered as an independent unit but rather as part of an economic unit using
the same name, personnel, technology, management, guidelines, and
funding. For strategic purposes, foreign investors operating as corpora-
tions might find operating through local subsidiaries very appealing be-
cause the mechanism allows them to limit their liability to the assets of
the local subsidiary. But that benefit also comes with the burden of re-
stricting the international protection of the foreign operations the foreign
investor might be entitled to, unless an exception has been expressly
agreed upon.8
In any event, in the absence of international investment arbitration,
disputes between foreign investors and host countries can only be settled
in two ways. First, the foreign investor initiates a lawsuit against the host
country in the host country's courts. But if the host country's judicial
system is not independent and reliable, the foreign investor may be sub-
ject to a biased trial where chances of success are slim.9 In exceptional
7. See Omar Garcfa-Bolfvar, The Issue of a Foreign Company Wholly Owned by Na-
tional Shareholders in the Context of ICSID Arbitration, 2 TRANSNAT'L DisP.
MGMT. no.5 (Nov. 2005), available at http://www.transnational-dispute-manage-
ment.com (last visited Jul. 20, 2006); see also Fransisco Orrego Vicufla, Changing
Approaches to the Nationality of Claims in the Context of Diplomatic Protection
and International Dispute Settlement, 15 ICSID REv.-FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J.
340 (2000).
8. See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Beig. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 47 (Feb.
5). After that case a trend was developed whereby countries agreed through trea-
ties to grant international protection to wholly owned subsidiaries if they were
controlled by a foreign company.
9. See Greta Gainer, Nationalization: The Dichotomy between Western and Third
World Perspectives in International Law, 26 How. L.J. 1547 (1983). Latin America
can claim authorship of the Calvo doctrine, which had been incorporated into the
constitutions of many countries, whereby foreign investors were not entitled to
take disputes with host states to the international arena. The doctrine is a reflec-
tion of a historic attitude against foreign investments. Accordingly, investors were
subject to the same treatment that domestic investors received in the host state,
not better. Therefore, they could only claim diplomatic protection from their
home states in a few restricted cases, and then only after exhausting local legal
remedies. See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 257 (4th ed. 1951).
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circumstances, if accepted by the host country, the foreign investor can be
entitled to local arbitration. Second, the foreign investor asks for diplo-
matic protection from his home country. The home country has sole dis-
cretion to decide whether to grant the diplomatic protection. If the home
country does grant the diplomatic protection, it might initiate a legal ac-
tion against the host country under the principles of international law,
such as the doctrine of state responsibility for injury to aliens. The home
country can initiate negotiations or present a claim against the host coun-
try, for instance before an international body such as the International
Court of Justice, if the conditions are in place. But regardless of where
the dispute is presented, in this scenario the foreign investor does not
have direct control of the dispute that turns into a dispute between states
where the diverse interests of one another, rather than the sole interests
of the investor, might play a role. 10
International investment arbitration is not something that is imposed
upon countries. On the contrary, it is something that the states in free
use of sovereignty agree to. A state may express consent to be subjected
to international arbitration initiated by foreign investors in different
ways. Some of the states do this in international instruments, such as
treaties for the promotion and protection of foreign investments or Bilat-
eral Investment Treaties (BITs), where each signatory country mutually
agrees to be subject to arbitral procedures, if all conditions are met, by
investors from the other country. Occasionally countries enter into Free
Trade Agreements (FTAs) with investment chapters, under which con-
sent to be subjected to international investment arbitration is granted.
This has been the case of the North America Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA)," the U.S.-Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade
Agreement,12 and the U.S. and Chile Free Trade Agreement, 13 among
others. In other cases, the consent to be subject to arbitration is ex-
pressed in internal laws, such as foreign investment laws or through ad-
hoc internal statements. The investors in turn also need to express con-
sent to arbitrate, something that in many cases is undertaken by filing the
claim.
An important number of international investment arbitrations are filed
10. See, e.g., Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, 109 (July
20).
11. See North American Free Trade Agreement ch. 11, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992,
32 I.L.M. 605, available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/nafta/chap-1l.pdf [herein-
after NAFTA].
12. See The Central America-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agree-
ment ch. 10, Cent. Am-Dom. Rep.-U.S., Aug. 5, 2005, available at http://www.ustr.
gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTADRFinalTexts/SectionIndex.
html.
13. See The United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement ch. 10, U.S.-Chile, June 6,
2003, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Fi-
nal_ Texts/SectionIndex.html.
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before the ICSID-a center created by an international convention.' 4
Countries that are signatories to the ICSID Convention do not automati-
cally become subject to international investment arbitration at that
center; express consent to be subject to international investment arbitra-
tion at ICSID is needed. Countries that have not signed the ICSID Con-
vention, but have consented to international investment arbitration, can
still be subject to procedures filed by foreign investors either at the IC-
SID additional facility 15 or at any other forum.
If the country has signed and ratified the ICSID Convention and has
also expressed consent to be subject to arbitration at that center, certain
conditions are necessary for the arbitral tribunal to have jurisdiction over
the matter in dispute. Of paramount importance, the dispute needs to be
about the legal issues of an investment. This requirement leaves out the
possibility of taking disputes of a technical nature or disputes of a legal
nature arising out of a trade operation. Likewise, the dispute needs to be
between foreign investors and countries other than their countries of na-
tionality. This issue might be of significance to investors who operate in
the host countries under the form of local subsidiaries, which, as men-
tioned before, will not be considered foreign investors in the absence of
an agreement to the contrary.
16
III. REASONS FOR THE EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
International investment arbitration is primarily a mechanism of pro-
tection of foreign investors' rights. But the instruments whereby interna-
tional investment arbitration has emerged have been treaties and
conventions between countries, not contracts between investors and
states. In other words, although foreign investors have been the main
beneficiaries of international investment arbitration, they have not partic-
ipated in the making of the documents from which the dispute resolution
mechanism has been brought about.
Capital-exporting countries have been enthusiastic about creating an
international legal framework of foreign investment. It would provide
their citizens with legal certainty, protection, and direct dispute control in
connection with business conducted in capital-importing countries. The
rationale of capital-exporting countries on proposing international instru-
14. Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of other States, Oct. 14, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 1270 (also known as the Washington Con-
vention) [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
15. ICSID additional facility is available in the context of investment disputes when-
ever the state party to the dispute or the state of nationality of the investor, but not
both, are not party to the ICSID Convention. See Rules Governing the Additional
Facility for the Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat of the Interna-
tional Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (Additional Facility Rule) art.
2, reprinted in ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, Document ICSID/15
(April 2006), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/partA-article.htm
#a02.
16. Garcfa-Bolivar, supra note 7.
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ments of protection of foreign investments historically has been to open
markets for their business groups while guaranteeing minimum standards
of treatment. 17 Over time capital-exporting countries have also been cap-
ital-importing countries and have also been subject to the standards of
the emerging international law of foreign investment. 18
As a consequence of the framework accepted by countries through
BITs and F1As, foreign investors have obtained international law protec-
tion for their property rights, minimum standards of treatment, and ac-
cess to international investment arbitration at a neutral and transparent
forum. 19
Capital-importing countries were convinced that upon accepting the
terms of international instruments for protection and promotion of for-
eign investments, they would be in a better position to foster their eco-
nomic development. Accordingly, if a country had a sound investment
climate, investors would be attracted to do business in that country. If
that investment climate provided stability, the stakes of that attractive-
ness would be higher. Plus there was no better way to guarantee the
stability of the legal framework, an instrumental part of the investment
climate, than internationalizing the legal framework of foreign invest-
ment. On doing that, the legal framework would be much more difficult
to change and investors would be provided with investment protection. It
was understood that investments would be more inclined to flow into a
country where foreign businesses were governed by an international legal
framework of foreign investments as opposed to a country were they
would only be subject to its internal laws.
Thus, many developing countries assumed that the path to economic
development was marked by foreign investments, which, it was argued,
would create jobs, transfer technology, boost production, and foster sav-
ings-things that were all considered essential to reduce poverty and con-
sequently promote wealth and economic growth.
The argument also followed that local investors would also be indirect
beneficiaries of the international investment law. By enhancing the stan-
dards of treatment for foreign investors according to international crite-
ria, the standards of treatment for local investors tended to be bettered, if
not at least harmonized, with the ones provided to foreigners.
In sum, by promoting international investment law, investors aspired to
have international protection for their investments while capital-import-
ing countries looked to enhance their appeal to investments deemed use-
ful in fostering economic development.
17. Examples are due process of law, protection against confiscation, and guarantees
of fair treatment and capital repatriation.
18. See e.g., Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 24
I.L.M. 811 (2003), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/22094.
pdf.
19. In general ICSID is considered a transparent and neutral forum to settle invest-
ment disputes. See ICSID Stakeholder Survey (Oct. 2004), available at http://
www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/icsid-client-survey-100904.pdf.
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IV. EVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA
The practical edge of international investment law is materialized
through international investment arbitration. The former provides the le-
gal framework of protection whereas the latter constitutes the mechanism
to make that protection real and eventually receive compensation for a
country that has failed to abide by the terms set up by international law
on behalf of foreign investors.
In Latin America, international investment arbitration has been tested
on many occasions. Arbitral tribunals have been established at the re-
quest of investors in varying circumstances, such as the passing of emer-
gency economic laws that affect businesses and imposition of regulations
to property rights or denial of justice, among others.2 0
A. ECONOMIC MEASURES
In CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina,21 the American company
CMS, who had invested in the Argentine company Transportadora de
Gas del Norte (TGN) and owned 29.42 percent of TGN's stock, was af-
fected by an alleged suspension by Argentina of a tariff-adjustment
formula for gas transportation that allegedly arose out of general eco-
nomic policies.
The tribunal stated that although it did not have jurisdiction over gen-
eral economic policies taken by Argentina, it did have jurisdiction over
measures of general economic policies that affect the investment, pro-
vided they have been adopted in violation of international law or in viola-
tion of commitments made to the investor. "This means in fact that the
issue of what falls within or outside the Tribunal's jurisdiction will be sub-
sumed in the determination of whether a given claim is or is not directly
connected with specific measures affecting the investment. '22
B. REGULATIONS TO PROPERTY
Other cases have dealt with regulatory powers of the government and
the balance to be guarded vis-A-vis the property rights of foreign investors
under international law. In this category arbitral decisions have dealt
with value-added taxes as regulations that have affected the property
rights of foreign investors in a way that contradicted the established inter-
national law. Likewise, arbitral tribunals have issued awards in the con-
text of governmental measures that changed the zoning of a land from
agriculture to commercial. Environmental measures that have been con-
sidered a substantial interference with the property rights of the foreign
investors have also been the subject matter of investment disputes against
Latin American countries. The same can be said of regulatory measures
20. UNCTAD Occasional Note, supra note 5.
21. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 42 I.L.M.
788 (2003), available at http://www.asil.org/ ilib/cms-argentina.pdf.
22. Id. $1 34.
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related to the treatment provided to foreign investors by media
regulators.2 3
In all of these cases the arbitral tribunals have dealt with a myriad of
issues that somehow have set up the criteria for future references. 24 One
of these is expropriation, dealt with by many arbitral tribunals, confirm-
ing a well-established principle of international law according that when-
ever a foreign investors' property is taken, there should be compensation
according to the Hull formula.2 5
But in some cases, when the expropriation has not been explicit, the
tribunals have had to consider different factors to determine if an expro-
priation has occurred in order to subsequently award compensation. For
example, in Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, the tribunal held that article 1110
of NAFTA also includes "covert or incidental interference with the use of
property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in sig-
nificant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of
the property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host
State." 26
Similarly, during Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, the ICSID arbitration tri-
bunal dealt with the issue of the date of the property taking to determine
the compensation payable. The tribunal noted that a measure taken for
the purpose of environmental protection that gradually deprived owners
of the value of their property was no different from a taking for which full
compensation must be paid. 27
Other awards have pointed to an analysis that balances the investor's
property rights and the public good. In S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, the
tribunal held that regulatory takings of property might include denying
the right to export with intent to transfer ownership.28 But the facts did
not support that happening to the claimant of that case.29
In Feldman v. Mexcio, the tribunal held that some business problems of
a foreign investor are not expropriations under NAFTA, and such was
the situation in Feldman.30 Similarly, in Azinian v. Mexico, the tribunal
stated that not all governmental interference with a foreign investment
23. UNCTAD Occasional Note, supra note 5.
24. Precedents are not binding in ICSID. See ICSID Convention, supra note 14, at
ch.4, art. 53(1). See also SGS Soci6t6 G6n6rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Philippines,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, available at http://worldbank.org/icsid/cases/SGSvPhil-
final.pdf.
25. Accordingly compensation should be adequate, prompt, and effective. This is the
Hull Formula, named after the U.S. Secretary of State Cordial Hull, who ex-
changed request on this sense with the Mexican government during the Mexican
expropriations that followed the Revolution. See Francesco Francioni, Compensa-
tion for Nationalisation of Foreign Property: The Borderland between Law and Eq-
uity, 24 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 225 (1975).
26. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 40 I.L.M 36, 16 IC-
SID REv.-FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 168, 195 1 103 (2001).
27. Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, 15 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN
INVESTMENT L.J. 169 (2000).
28. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, 40 I.L.M. 625 288 (2000).
29. Id.
30. Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)88/1, 42 I.L.M. 625 T 112 (2002).
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constitutes an expropriation. 31 The tribunal also found no expropriation
in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada.32 But it stated that to determine
"whether a particular interference with business activities amounts to an
expropriation, the test is whether that interference is sufficiently restric-
tive to support a conclusion that the property has been 'taken' from the
owner."
33
In Tecmed v. Mexico,34 the ICSID tribunal stressed the difference be-
tween direct, creeping, and de facto expropriation. The tribunal men-
tioned that, although creeping and de facto were kinds of indirect
expropriation, the latter referred to conduct or actions that do not state
an intent to deprive rights or assets but in fact have that effect,35 either by
"transfer[ring] assets to third parties different from the expropriating
State or ... without allocating such assets to third parties or to the Gov-
ernment. '36 The tribunal supported its award with case law and found
that there was de facto expropriation when the deprivation was irreversi-
ble and the action or decision destroyed the ability to use, enjoy, or dis-
pose of the assets or rights.37 This is the case even where legal ownership
over the assets in question is not affected.38 It then concluded that regu-
latory actions and measures would not be excluded from the definition of
expropriation if they are excessive in proportion to the public interest
being protected. 39 Accordingly, "[t]here must be a reasonable relation-
ship of proportionality between the charge or weight imposed to the for-
eign investor and the aim sought to be realized by any expropriatory
measure."
40
In sum, the principles set by those decisions can be useful in determin-
ing the extent that the regulatory authority of the states can be exercised
without giving grounds to compensation. The authority of the states to
regulate their economies remains intact, but if the regulation interferes
with the right of property in a way that leaves it useless for the owner,
then a regulatory taking has occurred and compensation should be paid.
Such judgments should be made on a case-by-case basis. Thus, if the sub-
stance of the right is affected so that the owner of an asset no longer has
the right to dispose, use, control, or profit from it, deprivation of property
may have occurred through creeping expropriation, de facto expropria-
tion, or constructive taking and the state must pay compensation. 41
31. Azinian v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2, 39 I.L.M. 537 91 83 (1999).
32. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, 122 INT'L L. RES. 336 (2000).
33. Id. 1 102.
34. Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/
00/2, 43 I.L.M. 133 (2004).
35. Id. 114.
36. Id. 91 113.
37. Id. 91 116.
38. Id.
39. Id. 91 122.
40. Id.
41. Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in In-
ternational Law, 176 RECUEIL DES CoURs 259, 330-31 (1982).
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C. SUDDEN CHANGES OF LAW
Sudden and unpredictable changes in the law have been considered
violations of the duty to act fairly and equitably. In MTD Equity Sdn
.Bhd v. Chile,42 a Malaysian company made an investment in Chile to
build a planned community in metropolitan Santiago. The company ob-
tained a permit to invest under the form of a contract with Chile's For-
eign Investment Commission. Subsequently, the investor learned that the
land where the community was to be built could only be used for agricul-
tural purposes and could not be changed without violating Chile's urban
development and environmental policies. The investor initiated ICSID
arbitration and alleged indirect expropriation and unfair and inequitable
treatment in violation of the Malaysia-Chile BIT. The investor alleged
the government violated its obligation to provide fair and equitable treat-
ment by approving its investment in spite of knowing that the investment
was not possible to be fulfilled.
Based on the Malaysia-Chile BIT Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause,
the fair and equitable treatment provisions of the Denmark-Chile and the
Croatia-Chile BITs were deemed applicable to the investor. The tribunal
held that states have no limits in their authority under national laws or
policies except to the extent that exercising that authority would contra-
vene obligations undertaken in a BIT. It further indicated, "in terms of
the BIT, fair and equitable treatment should be understood to be treat-
ment in an even-handed and just manner, conducive to fostering the pro-
motion of foreign investment. '43
But the tribunal stressed that "BITs are not an insurance against busi-
ness risk" 44 and pointed out that under international law a state cannot
be compelled to change a policy or pass a law. The investor was not enti-
tled to the amendment of a policy on land use. The investor was not
denied a permit but a change in a regulation. Thus, lack of change of the
public policy was not considered an expropriation but an unfair treat-
ment, for the investor was admitted to invest in the country under circum-
stances known by the state, all of which made the investment unfeasible.
The tribunal reached a decision whereby only a portion of the compensa-
tion claimed by the Malaysian firm was awarded because "[t]he Claim-
ants failed to protect themselves from business risks inherent to their
investment in Chile."4 5
42. MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd v. Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7 (2004), available at
http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisionsfMTD-Chile-Award-25May2004.pdf
(last visited July 20, 2006).
43. Id. [ 113.
44. Id. [ 178.
45. Id. 91 253(2).
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D. DENIAL OF JUSTICE
International investment arbitral tribunals involving Latin American
countries have been friendly to considering denial of justice as a violation
of the standard of treatment.
In Waste Management Inc. v. Mexico,46 an American company brought
a second claim against Mexico 4 7 under chapter eleven of NAFI'A. It was
submitted to ICSID's additional facility. 48 The dispute arose out of a
concession contract between Waste Management's Mexican subsidiary,
Acaverde, and the City of Acapulco, where the investor was granted the
exclusive right to dispose of the municipal waste generated in a certain
district of Acapulco and to provide street cleaning services. The city was
to enforce the ordinances that prohibited others from providing compet-
ing services in that district. The parties clashed over certain terms during
the implementation of the contract and a dispute arose. The investor
filed an arbitration claim alleging violation of the treatment and expropri-
ation provisions of NAFTA chapter eleven because it was subject to arbi-
trary acts by the state that "were capricious, lacking in due process of law
and which rendered the investment valueless." 4
9
The investor alleged that the Mexican State had violated article 1105 of
NAFTA by committing a denial of justice because the city of Acapulco
adopted a litigation strategy that slowed the process of recovery under
local laws. The tribunal pointed out "that a litigant cannot commit a de-
nial of justice unless its improper strategies are endorsed and acted on by
the court, or unless the law gives it some extraordinary privilege which
leads to a lack of due process. '50 It also stressed that "the basic obliga-
tion of the State under Article 1105(1) is to act in good faith and form,
and not deliberately to set out to destroy or frustrate the investment by
improper means."'5 1
But in the same case, the tribunal stressed that non-performance of a
contract is not expropriation.
[A]n enterprise is not expropriated just because its debts are not paid
or other contractual obligations towards it are breached .... It is not
the function of Article 1110 to compensate for failed business ven-
tures, absent arbitrary intervention by the State amounting to a vir-
tual taking or sterilising of the enterprise. 52
46. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/03, 41 I.L.M. 1315
(2004), available at http://www.economiasnci.gob.mx/sphp-pages/importa/sol_ con-
tro/consultoria/CasosMexico/Waste 2 management/laudo/laudo-ingles.pdf (last
visited Jul 20, 2006).
47. The first ICSID tribunal dismissed Waste Management's claim because it had
failed to waive those domestic proceedings in Mexico.
48. Mexico is not a signatory of the ICSID Convention.
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It then pointed out that "non-performance of a contractual obligation
is not to be equated with a taking of property, nor (unless accompanied
by other elements) is it tantamount to expropriation. '53
The tribunal concluded that "it is one thing to expropriate a right under
a contract and another to fail to comply with the contract. ' 54 It then
added that "it is not the function of the international law of expropriation
as reflected in Article 1110 to eliminate the normal commercial risks of a
foreign investor[.] ... A failing enterprise is not expropriated just because
debts are not paid or other contractual obligations are not fulfilled. '55
The tribunal dismissed the claim and found no breach of article 1105 or
1110 of NAFTA.
In Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States,56 the tribunal also dealt with
the issue of denial of justice in connection with an alleged violation of
article 1121 of NAFTA. It stated that
[a]lthough the precise purpose of NAFTA Article 1121 is not alto-
gether clear, it requires a waiver of domestic proceedings as a condi-
tion of making a claim to a NAFTA tribunal. . . .One thing is,
however, reasonably clear about Article 1121 and that is that it says
nothing expressly about the requirement that, in the context of a ju-
dicial violation of international law, the judicial process be continued
to the highest level. Nor is there any basis for implying any dispensa-
tion of that requirement. It would be strange indeed if sub silentio
the international rule were to be swept away. And it would be very
strange if a State were to be confronted with liability for a breach of
international law committed by its magistrate or low-ranking judicial
officer when domestic avenues of appeal are not pursued, let alone
exhausted. If Article 1121 were to have that effect, it would en-
courage resort to NAFTA tribunals rather than resort to the appel-
late courts and review processes of the host State, an outcome which
would seem surprising, having regard to the sophisticated legal sys-
tems of the NAFTA Parties.57
The tribunal concluded that Loewen failed to pursue available domes-
tic remedies, and as a consequence, there was no violation of customary
international law, nor a violation of NAFTA that the United States could
be held liable.
E. UMBRELLA CLAUSE
Many BITs and investment chapters of FTAs establish that breach of
contracts or other obligations by the state will be considered violation of
the agreements. That is commonly known as the umbrella clause. Some
arbitral tribunals involving developing countries have dealt with the issue
53. Id. 9 174.
54. Id. 175.
55. Id. 177.
56. Loewen Group, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3.
57. Id. IT 161-62.
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differently. The outcomes of those cases have had an impact on the inter-
pretation of similar facts involving Latin American countries.
In SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan,58 a Swiss
company, SGS, had entered into a contract with Pakistan to provide pre-
shipment inspection services for goods to be exported from certain coun-
tries to Pakistan. Subsequently Pakistan notified SGS that the contract
was terminated. Both Pakistan and SGS initiated separate legal actions
in Switzerland and Pakistan for breach of contract. SGS also filed a re-
quest for ICSID arbitration alleging that Pakistan had breached the con-
tract and had also violated the BIT between Switzerland and Pakistan.
Pakistan objected to the tribunal's jurisdiction, inter alias, because the
dispute had arisen out of actions and omissions with respect to a contrac-
tual arrangement (between Pakistan and SGS) that had a choice of forum
provision different from ICSID.
SGS argued that by virtue of an arguable umbrella clause (article 11) in
the relevant BIT,59 a breach of contract was elevated to a violation of a
BIT. Thus, when the contract was breached, SGS had two actions against
Pakistan-one for breach of contract and one for violation of the BIT.
The tribunal appeared to be the first ICSID tribunal facing the issue of
whether a BIT provision could transform a purely contractual claim into
a BIT claim. It held "that under general international law, a violation of
a contract entered into by a State with an investor of another State, is not,
by itself, a violation of international law."' 60 But it "is not saying that
States may not agree with each other in a BIT that henceforth, all
breaches of each State's contracts with investors of the other State are
forthwith converted into and be treated as breaches of the BIT."6 1
But the tribunal found that was not the intention of the parties to the
BIT; it rejected SGS's argument about article 11. The tribunal pointed
out that article 11 contained an obligation to constantly guarantee the
observance of the commitments the state has entered into with respect to
the investments of the other contracting party. Those commitments could
imply implementing rules to give effect to contractual or statutory under-
takings or could preclude a state from taking actions short of denial of
justice.
The tribunal concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over the con-
tractual claim or over the contractual claim transformed into a BIT claim
58. SGS Societ6 G6n6rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan, 18 INT'L ARB. REP. 9
(2003).
59. Article 11 of the Switzerland-Pakistan BIT provided: "Either Contracting Party
shall constantly guarantee the observance of the commitments it has entered into
with respect to the investments of the investors of the other Contracting Party."
Accord Entre la Conf6ddration Suisse et la R6publique des Philippines Con-
cernant la Promotion et la Protection R6ciproque des Investissements art. 11,
Switz.-Phil., Mar. 31, 1997, 0.975.264.5 (Fr.) (translated by author).
60. SGS v. Pakistan, 18 INT'L ARB. REP. 1 167.
61. Id. 173.
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by virtue of an umbrella clause. But it retained jurisdiction over the
other parts of the BIT claim.
But other tribunals had a different view of the umbrella clause. In SGS
Socit6 Gen&ale de Surveillance S.A. v. Philippines,62 the Philippines
awarded SGS, a Swiss business group, a contract to provide comprehen-
sive import supervision for goods prior to shipment to the Philippines and
specialized services to assist in improving the customs clearance and con-
trol processes. Part of the service was undertaken overseas.
A dispute arose between SGS and the Philippines concerning alleged
breaches of the services contract. SGS submitted certain monetary claims
to the Philippines for amicable settlement before submitting the dispute
to arbitration. SGS invoked the provisions of the 1997 BIT, an agree-
ment between the Swiss Confederation and the Republic of the Philip-
pines on the promotion and protection of investments.
The tribunal was faced with a question similar to the one made in SGS
v. Pakistan. Specifically, the tribunal had to determine whether a breach
of contract was considered a violation of a BIT as per an umbrella clause.
To do that it had to analyze article X(2) of the Switzerland-Philippines
BIT, which read: "Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it
has assumed with regard to specific investments in its territory by inves-
tors of the other Contracting Party. '63
The question in place this time was whether that provision gave the
tribunal jurisdiction over claims against the respondent state that were
essentially contractual. The tribunal held that, "if commitments made by
the State towards specific investments do involve binding obligations or
commitments under the applicable law, it seems entirely consistent with
the object and purpose of the BIT to hold that they are incorporated and
brought within the framework of the BIT by Article X(2). ' ' 64
The tribunal concluded,
Article X(2) makes it a breach of the BIT for the host State to fail to
observe binding commitments, including contractual commitments,
which it has assumed with regard to specific investments. But it does
not convert the issue of the extent or content of such obligations into
an issue of international law.65
Recently, in El Paso Energy International Company v. Argentina,6 6 the
tribunal looked at the aforementioned cases. It stressed that the BITs
should be interpreted in a balanced way, considering "both State sover-
eignty and the State's responsibility to create an adapted and evolution-
62. SGS v. Philippines ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6.
63. Accord Entre la Confdd6ration Suisse et la R6publique des Philippines Con-
cernant la Promotion et la Protection Rdciproque des Investissements, supra note
59 (translated by author).
64. SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6 117.
65. Id 1 128.
66. El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15 (2006), availa-
ble at http://www.investmentclaims.com/ decisions[ElPasoEnergy-Argentina Ju-
risdictionalDecision.pdf (last visited July 20. 2006).
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ary framework for the development of economic activities, and the
necessity to protect foreign investment and its continuing flow." 67
It then endorsed the interpretation given in the SGS v. Pakistan and
stated
that the umbrella clause does not extend to any contract claims when
such claims do not rely on a violation of the standards of protection
of the BIT, namely, national treatment, MFN clause, fair and equita-
ble treatment, full protection and security, protection against arbi-
trary and discriminatory measures, protection against expropriation
or nationalisation either directly or indirectly, unless some require-
ments are respected. 68
F. INVESTORS' NATIONALITY
The nationality of the investor has been a common issue in the context
of international investment disputes. For ICSID to have jurisdiction, the
legal investment dispute needs to be between a contracting state and a
national of another contracting state. If the dispute is between a national
of the contracting state and that state, ICSID will not have jurisdiction.
Thus, the criteria to determine when a party is a national of a state are
crucial. Furthermore, article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention states
that any juridical person with the nationality of the contracting state party
to the dispute can have the treatment of a national of another contracting
state for purposes of the Convention, if that juridical person is under for-
eign control and the parties have agreed to such treatment. But the IC-
SID Convention does not provide for a definition of foreign control.
Recent ICSID tribunals have addressed these issues.
In one case when an individual had nationality from one state and resi-
dence from another state, the tribunal had to establish clarifications. In
the Feldman case,69 the tribunal mentioned that nationality and residence
were different concepts. Nationality was the main connecting factor be-
tween a state and an individual. It also stated that nationality prevailed
over permanent residence in matters of standing.
Mr. Feldman was a national of the United States but had residence in
Mexico. ICSID's jurisdiction was objected to by Mexico based on article
201 of NAFTA, which provides that a national is, among others, a citizen
or permanent resident. If Mr. Feldman was considered a national of
Mexico, he did not have standing to initiate a proceeding before ICSID.
The tribunal solved the issue by stating that article 201 of NAFTA was
only relevant with respect to the state party other than the one where the
investment is made. Thus, a permanent resident in the United States who
did not have American citizenship could claim to have U.S. nationality
for purposes of NAFTA protection and initiate an arbitration proceeding
67. Id. [ 70.
68. Id. 84.
69. Feldman, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)88/1.
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before ICSID. Mr. Feldman, however, was found to only have U.S. na-
tionality. For that reason the issue of double nationality did not arise.
In another case the tribunal had to deal with nationality of an entity
when there was foreign control. In Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela,
C.A. (AUCOVEN) v. Venezuela,70 the tribunal was asked to address the
issue of foreign control of a company with the nationality of the host
state. The tribunal emphasized the role of the consent of the parties. The
parties had agreed in a concession contract to ICSID jurisdiction, subject
to the condition that the majority of the shares in AUCOVEN were
transferred to a national of another contracting state. Upon that happen-
ing, the parties agreed that AUCOVEN would be considered a company
under foreign control and consequently a national of another contracting
state. The tribunal found that the parties chose to define the term foreign
control, taking into consideration only the transfer of shares of
AUCOVEN.
It also stressed that economic criteria usually reflect reality better than
legal criteria. But the tribunal had to mark distance from that statement
and distinguished from SOABI v. SenegaF1 and Amco v. Indonesia72
where the tribunals made interpretations to determine the foreign control
beyond the first level of control, although they reached different levels of
control.
On determining the nationality of the company that acquired the ma-
jority of the shares of AUCOVEN, the tribunal used the most common
criterion (i.e., place of incorporation). It concluded that it had jurisdic-
tion because AUCOVEN, a company incorporated in Venezuela, was
under control of an American company and the parties consented that
that factor was sufficient to consider the investor a national of another
contracting state.
Although not involving a Latin American country, an investment arbi-
tral tribunal had to look at the issue of nationality when there was a
group of companies. In Banro American Resources, Inc. v. Republic of
the Congo,73 the tribunal looked at the company's nationality from a dif-
ferent perspective: the company with the nationality of the other con-
tracting state and the company giving the consent and in connection with
whom the host state gave consent to arbitrate disputes involving them
were not the same.
The tribunal established that a company could transfer consent to a
subsidiary to submit a dispute to ICSID as per the terms of the agreement
where consent was originally granted. But for the consent to be transfer-
70. Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela, C.A. (AUCOVEN) v. Venezuela, ICSID
Case No. ARB/O0/5 (2001), available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/deci-
sions/ Autopista-Venezuela-Award-27Sept200l.pdf (last visited July 20, 2006).
71. SOABI v. Senegal, 2 ICSID Rep. 164, 182-83 (1984).
72. Amco v. Indonesia, 1 ICSID Rep. 376, 404-05 (1983).
73. Banro American Resources, Inc. v. Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/
98/7 (2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/banro-excerpts.pdf
(last visited July 20, 2006).
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able the consent had to be previously granted. In the case in point, the
consent could not have been granted nor transferred because the parent
company did not have the nationality of a contracting state to the ICSID
Convention. Thus, if a claimant lacked the nationality of a contracting
state, ICSID could not have jurisdiction. The tribunal also considered the
possibility of the claimant having the nationality of a contracting state but
not having granted consent, and the possibility of the host state granting
consent but not including disputes involving the claimant. In both cases
the tribunal stated that it lacked jurisdiction.
On reaching a conclusion, the tribunal established differences with two
previous cases: a) where a request to submit a dispute to ICSID was sub-
mitted by a member company of a group of companies while the consent
was expressed by another company of the group; and b) when following
the transfer of shares, the request to submit the dispute to ICSID came
from the transferee company while the consent had been given by the
company making the transfer. The tribunal stressed that in general it
tends to be less formalistic and that ICSID is more willing to work its way
from the subsidiary to the parent company rather than the other way
around. "Consent expressed by a subsidiary is considered to have been
given by the parent company, the actual investor, whose subsidiary is
merely an 'instrumentality.' "74
G. MFN
In a peculiar case, a MFN clause of a BIT was used to extend ICSID
jurisdiction. In Maffezini v. Spain,75 the tribunal analyzed the MFN
clause of the Argentina-Spain BIT in connection with the provisions of
the Chile-Spain BIT, which did not require exhausting a certain period of
time before filing a claim.
The tribunal noticed two principles: res inter alios acta and ejusdem
generis. According to res inter alios acta, the treaties are valid among the
parties. According to ejusdem generis, the effect of a treaty can be ex-
tended via the MFN clause to treaties of the same nature. The tribunal
ruled that in the absence of express provisions to the contrary, the provi-
sions of investment disputes of another treaty of the same nature can be
extended to an investor of a third country because the purpose of the
BITs is to protect foreign investors and their rights, and because the pro-
visions of investment disputes settlement are inextricably related to in-
vestment protection. The tribunal also stated some exceptions to the
ruling, such as when consent to arbitration is conditioned on exhaustion
of local remedies, when the parties have the option to choose between
local remedies or international arbitration, and when the parties have
chosen an institutional arbitration. The tribunal applied the procedural
74. Id. T 12.
75. Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 (2000), available at http://www. in-
vestmentclaims.com/decisions/Maffezini-Spain-Jurisdiction-25Jan2000-Eng.pdf
(last visited July 20, 2006).
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provisions of the Chile-Spain BIT and ruled that the investor did not
have to exhaust a certain period of time before filing a claim against the
state.
V. THE JUDGMENT
As noted previously, international investment law has been motivated
by two reasons: protection of foreign investors and economic develop-
ment of countries.
The evidence portrayed in the previous sections shows that the inter-
ests of the foreign investors have been protected. Foreign investors have
found, in international investment law, a shield that not only protects
their property rights and sets minimum international standards of treat-
ment, but also a mechanism to make that protection enforceable under
the form of international investment arbitration. But international in-
vestment arbitration has not been biased against the interests of countries
or in favor of investors, a factor that speaks about the independence and
neutrality of that alternative dispute resolution mechanism.
A. STATISTICS
For instance, until the year 2003, of eighteen awards on the merits is-
sued by ICSID arbitral tribunals, the claimants (i.e., the investors) pre-
vailed in ten awards, whereas in eight awards, their claims were dismissed
and the states prevailed. 76 In the context of NAFTA, the investors had
prevailed in two awards and the states had prevailed in four awards.77
More recent data available from investment arbitration cases filed under
ICSID, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law rules, 78
and other arbitration centers79 show a similar picture; out of forty-six
cases where there was a partial or final award on the merits and where
jurisdiction was upheld, investors prevailed in twenty-seven, but lost to
the states in nineteen, including four in favor of the United States and
four in favor of Mexico under NAFTA. 80
Nevertheless, in the context of international investment arbitrations,
the issue of economic development of countries has rarely been consid-
ered, although there are many circumstances where economic develop-
ment could be analyzed by the arbitral tribunals.
76. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004: MAKING SERVICES WORK
FOR POOR PEOPLE167 box 9.4.
77. Id.
78. Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
[UNCITRAL], G.A. Res. 31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976), available at http://www.uncitral.
org/pdflenglish/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf (last visited July 20, 2006).
79. Other arbitration centers such as the London Court of International Arbitration
and International Chamber of Commerce have issued investment arbitration
awards. See, e.g., Investment Treaty Arbitration, Investment Treaty Awards:
Chronological Listing, http://ita.law.uvic.ca/chronologicallist.htm.
80. Id.
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B. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
For example, commentators have suggested that for an investment to
be qualified as foreign and, hence, entitled to access the investment dis-
pute settlement mechanism of ICSID, certain conditions need to be met:
a) the project must have a certain duration; b) there must be a certain
regularity in the earnings and the return; c) there should be a typical ele-
ment of risk on both sides; d) there should be a substantial commitment
to develop certain activities; and e) the operation must be significant for
the development of the host state, as stated in the Convention's pream-
ble. 81 In some decisions on jurisdiction, these criteria have been consid-
ered incidentally.
In Salini Costruttori S.P.A. v. Morocco,82 two Italian companies
claimed compensation for damages from Morocco under the treaty be-
tween the government of Morocco and the government of Italy for the
reciprocal promotion and protection of iniestments due to a dispute that
arose out of the construction contract related to a section of a highway
joining Rabat to F6s. Morocco objected to the tribunal jurisdiction based
on different grounds, one that referred to the argument that construction
contracts did not qualify as investments under the ICSID Convention.
Upon considering that objection, the tribunal pointed out that the ICSID
Convention does not define the term investment. It then considered the
criteria generally identified by the Convention's commentators, indicat-
ing that the criteria included the existence of contribution, certain dura-
tion, and risk participation. It also added that the operation should
contribute to the development of the host state, as provided by the Con-
vention's preamble.83 The tribunal found that the construction contract
fulfilled the criteria. Even in regard to the risk aspect, the tribunal indi-
cated that a construction project that lasts several years, for which total
costs cannot be established with certainty in advance, created a risk for
the contractor. Thus, a construction operation could qualify as an invest-
ment, and the disputes that arise directly out of it are susceptible to be
heard by ICSID. In connection with the economic development require-
ment, the tribunal mentioned that in most countries construction of infra-
structure falls under the tasks to be carried out by the state or by other
public authorities. It then mentioned that the highway in question served
the public interest and that the claimant companies were also able to pro-
vide the host state with know-how in relation to the work. 84
The tribunal also mentioned that all the elements to be taken into ac-
count for defining when there is an investment in the context of the IC-
SID Convention may be interdependent. Thus, had the investment failed
the test of any of the elements (i.e., the one on economic development),
81. ICSID Convention, supra note 14, at pmbl.
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the tribunal would have had to reject the claim and declare that it did not
have jurisdiction.
Based on the claimants' fulfillment of each of the criteria, the tribunal
found that the construction contract constituted an activity within ICSID
jurisdiction and that disputes arising directly out of the contract would be
heard by the tribunal.
Thus, based on Salini's argument, an ICSID arbitral tribunal could
deny jurisdiction to an investment dispute when the investment has been
detrimental to the host country's development. A consideration of that
nature might touch the merits of the case, and hence it could be an issue
to be analyzed and solved by each tribunal on a case by case basis.
C. LOCAL INVESTORS
Likewise, the issue of economic development in the context of foreign
investment could be considered by arbitral tribunals to deny jurisdiction
when an analysis of the substance beyond the forms yields the result that
the dispute is not between a foreign investor and the host state but be-
tween a local investor disguised as a foreigner and its state of nationality.
In some cases that analysis has been flexible. As a result, arbitral tribu-
nals have ended up looking at disputes between local investors and their
states.
In Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine,85 a firm incorporated in Lithuania, but of
whom the majority of shares were owned by Ukrainian nationals, initi-
ated arbitration against Ukraine. The firm alleged that the Ukrainian
government breached the Ukraine-Lithuania BIT. Ukraine objected to
the tribunal's jurisdiction, arguing, inter alia, that the claimant was not a
foreign investor and hence the dispute was between a state and its own
citizens and therefore, not a matter for ICSID arbitration.
The Ukraine-Lithuania BIT defined foreign investors as those entities
incorporated in the other state party. Based on that definition, the ma-
jority of the tribunal stated that the parties to a BIT were free to deter-
mine the criteria for nationality 86 and set the definition of investor and
foreign control of a local entity for purposes of article 25(2)(b) of the
ICSID Convention. Accordingly, it was not up to the tribunal to question
the criteria used therein.
Article 25(2)(b) states:
Contracting Parties are free to define their consent to jurisdiction in
terms that are broad or narrow; they may employ a control-test or
reserve the right to deny treaty protection to claimants who other-
wise would have recourse under the BIT. Once that consent is de-
fined, however, tribunals should give effect to it, unless doing so
would allow the Convention to be used for purposes for which it
85. Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18 (2004), available at http://
worldbank.org/reisd/cases/tokius-decision.pdf.
86. Id. at 215, $ 24.
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clearly was not intended. 87
The majority thus concluded that Tokios was a foreign investor under
the terms of the BIT and rejected Ukraine's objection to jurisdiction,
stating,
In our view, however, neither the text of the definition of "invest-
ment," nor the context in which the term is defined, nor the object
and purpose of the Treaty allow such an origin-of-capital require-
ment to be implied. The requirement is plainly absent from the
text.... [T]he origin-of-capital requirement is inconsistent with the
object and purpose of the Treaty, which... is to provide broad pro-
tection to investors and their investments in the territory of either
party.88
The majority then held that, "the ICSID Convention contains no incho-
ate requirement that the investment at issue in a dispute have an interna-
tional character in which the origin of the capital is decisive." 89
Regarding the Convention's purpose, the majority considered that the
decision had not allowed "the Convention to be used for purposes for
which it clearly was not intended." 90
The dissenting arbitrator stressed that the purpose of the ICSID Con-
vention was to govern international investments: investments character-
ized by a trans-border movement of capital rather than investment
disputes between a country and its citizens.9 1 In the dissenting opinion,
the minority arbitrator explained this distinction, stating,
when it comes to ascertaining the international character of an in-
vestment, the origin of the capital is relevant, and even decisive.
True, the Convention does not provide a precise and clear-cut defini-
tion of the concept of international investment-no more than it pro-
vides a precise and clear-cut definition of the concept investment-,
and it is therefore for each ICSID tribunal to determine whether the
specific facts of the case warrant the conclusion that it is before an
international investment.92
The dissenting arbitrator also objected to the right of contracting par-
ties to extend the Convention's jurisdiction, explaining,
it is within the limits determined by the basic ICSID Convention that
the BITs may determine the jurisdiction and powers of the ICSID
tribunal, and it is not for the Contracting Parties in their BIT to ex-
tend the jurisdiction of the ICSID tribunal beyond the limits deter-
mined by the basic ICSID Convention.93
87. Id. at 220, T 39.
88. Id. at 233, 1 77.
89. Id. at 235, 1 82.
90. Id. at 220, 91 39.
91. See Id. at 252 (Weil, dissenting).
92. Id. at 253, 20.
93. Id. at 249-50, 1 13.
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The doctrine of company law is based on assumptions regarding the
costs and benefits provided by limited liability. Generally, it is under-
stood that limiting shareholders' liability is socially beneficial as it allows
a greater number of people to establish or own portions of a corporation
and allows for greater specialization of a firm's functions and the exter-
nalization of business risks beyond its owners to creditors, who may be
better suited to bare risk.94 But should the negative externalities pro-
duced by limited liability exceed those deemed acceptable; the legal per-
sonality of the company can be disregarded.
The abuse of legal personality apparent in Tokios offered arbitrators
the means by which the formal definition of nationality could have been
weighed against its social costs. In Tokios, the use of a Lithuanian com-
pany owned by Ukrainian nationals to obtain international protection
against Ukraine not only constituted an abuse of the legal personality of
the Lithuanian company but also created a risk for the entire interna-
tional investment arbitration system. Investment disputes between states
and their citizens-albeit disguised as foreigners-could be settled
internationally.
The majority's decision to take a formalistic rather than an instrumen-
talist approach was contrary to the primary purpose of the ICSID Con-
vention: to protect foreign investments. A teleological approach might
have disregarded the legal personality based on the Ukrainian owners'
abuse of it by pursuing international protection on behalf of a purely do-
mestic investment.
As a result, the decision of Tokios not only failed to protect a truly
foreign investment, it also failed to foster the economic development of
the respondent state by opening a venue for local investors to sue their
own countries. Such a consequence was not in tune with the rationale
that originally moved countries to accept international investment
arbitration.
D. AMOUNT OF AWARDS
Analysis of economic development issues could have been considered
for determining the amount of the arbitral awards. For developing coun-
tries under financial stress exorbitant awards could have a tremendous
impact on economic development policies and affect their
implementation.
Perhaps for this reason, tribunals should consider issues such as the
level of poverty of the country in question, amount of public debt, and
fiscal deficit, along with the relevant arguments on the merits and impose
awards-when needed-that protect foreign investment but do not im-
pair the economic development of the recipient countries.
94. Franck H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischell, Limited Liablity and the Corporation,
52 U. CHI. L.R. 99 (1985).
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For example, in an investment arbitration case against Ecuador, the
investor, American Petroleum Company Occidental was awarded $71
million. 95 For a country with 12 million people living below an annual
income of $3,260 per capita, with a long term debt of $16 billion, a GDP
of $30 billion, 96 and a debt service ratio of 31 percent,9 7 an award of that
magnitude could mean significantly less money devoted to economic
development.
If one were to add the arbitration costs to the amount of the awards,
the impact could be greater. Costs of investment arbitrations are high.
On average, the cost of these cases range around $2 million in fees with
around $400 thousand in pure costs under the low range.98 In some cases
the fees have been as high as $4 million, as was the case in Metalclad.99
Obviously, arbitrators are called to solve disputes, not to solve eco-
nomic issues. But when the facts are analyzed and the legal instruments
give room for considering economic development issues, a careful analy-
sis of the interests of host countries should be undertaken and, if possible,
weight should be given to the impact an award might have on the wellbe-
ing of the citizens of that country.
The question is where arbitrators should draw the line so that the rights
and interests of the investors are protected, as established in the relevant
international investment law, while economic development issues are
considered. Stretching that line too far from the agreed law might impair
the predictability expected in international investment law. But not con-
sidering issues of economic development in the analysis of investment
arbitration cases might also impair not only the compliance of the awards
but the evolution of international investment law as well.
E. INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
Be that as it may, investment arbitral tribunals are empowered with
different international instruments of law to consider issues of economic
development while protecting foreign investments and investors.
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, the
purpose of the treaties as expressed in their body texts, preambles, an-
nexes, and travaux pr~paratoires shall be taken into account in treaty in-
95. UNCTAD Occasional Paper, supra note 5. By the time of publication of this arti-
cle a newspaper reported that an arbitral tribunal in Azurix Corp. v. Argentina had
issued an award ordering Argentina to pay Azurix $165.2 million. See Lucio Fer-
nandez Moores, Ordenan al Estado Pagarle a una Privatizada US$165, 2 millones,
CLARIN.COM, July 18, 2006 (Arg.), http://www.clarin.com/diario/2006/07/18lelpais/
p-01001.htm (last visited July 20, 2006).
96. World Bank Indicators Database, http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/ (select
Ecuador as the selected country; click next; select GDP, Long-term debt, and Pop-
ulation, total as the selected series; click next; select 2003, 2004, and 2005 as se-
lected years; click next).
97. The World in 2006, THE ECONOMIST, at 41.
98. UNCTAL Occasional Paper, supra note 5.
99. The U.S. Government asked the losing party, the investor, for payment of $4 mil-
lion in legal costs. This figure does not take into account the costs of a review of
the award undertaken by a Canadian court. See id.
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terpretation.10 0 Specifically, article 31 of the Vienna Convention states
that, "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose."'10 1
Article 32 also states:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, in-
cluding the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of
its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the
application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the inter-
pretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous
or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable.1 0 2
The ICSID Convention has addressed the question of the purpose of
international investment agreements by means of textual reference to ec-
onomic development in its preamble where it states, "[c]onsidering the
need for international cooperation for economic development, and the
role of private international investment therein." 10 3
While the report from the executive directors states that the primary
purpose of the Convention is to stimulate international investment flows,
the report underlines the body's desire to address the interests of both
investors and states:
The Executive Directors believe that private capital will continue to
flow to countries offering a favorable climate for attractive and
sound investments, even if such countries did not become parties to
the Convention or, having joined, did not make use of the facilities
of the Centre. On the other hand, adherence to the Convention by a
country would provide additional inducement and stimulate a larger
flow of private international investment into its territories, which is
the primary purpose of the Convention.
While the broad objective of the Convention is to encourage a larger
flow of private international investment, the provisions of the Convention
maintain a careful balance between the interests of investors and those of
host States. 10 4
Whereas occasional investment agreements place economic develop-
ment within the teleology of international investment law, the majority of
international investment agreements limit their purpose to the promotion
and protection of foreign investment. One of the most contentious legal
100. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 155 U.N.T.S. 331,
available at http://www.untreaty.un.org/lic/texts/instruments/english/conventions/
11__1969.pdf (last visited July 20, 2006).
101. Id. at art. 31(1).
102. Id. at art. 32.
103. ICSID Convention, supra note 14, at pmbl.
104. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Report of the Executive
Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States, [ 12-13 (Mar. 18, 1965), available at http://
www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/partB-section03.htm (last visited July 20, 2006).
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bodies dealing with international investment, NAFTA, which covers the
treatment of investments in chapter 11, does not mention economic de-
velopment. As NAFTA's chapter 11 does not define objectives that are
particular to the investment provisions, the agreement's purpose as re-
lated to investments is the same as that of the rest of the agreement. The
preamble of NAFTA states that the treaty seeks to, "[contribute] to the
harmonious development and expansion of world trade and provide a
catalyst to broader international cooperation; ... [and ensure] a predict-
able commercial framework for business planning and investment." 10 5
From this reading, it seems that the reference to development made in
the preamble relates to world trade development, presumably a synonym
of trade growth. Thus, as NAFTA does not mention economic develop-
ment in its trade-related sections or preamble, investments are not re-
quired to contribute to economic development in order to receive treaty
protection.
In general, the international investment agreements that the United
States is a party to extend investor protection further than agreements
made by other states. The United States typically requires that interna-
tional investment agreements grant party investors the right to invest.
That is, these agreements extend protection beyond the treatment and
grant investors the right of entry for future foreign investments to be
made into party states. U.S. agreements also generally forbid the imposi-
tion of performance requirements, such as the use of local content, export
requirements, employment, and technology transfer, on foreign investors,
which have been used to ensure that investments render economic bene-
fit to the host state. 10 6
Noticeably, the 2004 U.S. model BIT seems much more balanced than
previous model agreements. It affirms the desire "to promote greater ec-
onomic cooperation between" signatories "with respect to investment by
nationals and enterprises of one Party in the territory of the other
Party. °1 0 7 The model treaty also recognizes "that agreement on the treat-
ment to be accorded such investment will stimulate the flow of private
capital and the economic development of the Parties" and states that sig-
natories agree "that a stable framework for investment will maximize ef-
fective utilization of economic resources and improve living
standards." 108
From the wording of the preamble in the model BIT, it seems that
another purpose of the parties is to encourage economic development
105. NAFTA, supra note 11, at pmbl.
106. Marie-Frane Houde & Katia Yannaca-Small, Relationships Between International
Investment Agreements (OECD, Working Papers on Int'l Inv., Paper No. 2004/1),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/43/31784519.pdf.
107. 2004 U.S. Model BIT, Treaty Between the Government of The United States Of
America And The Government Of [Country] Concerning The Encouragement
And Reciprocal Protection Of Investment, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/
assets/TradeSectors/Investment/ModelBIT/asset-upload-file847_6897.pdf (last
visited July 20, 2006).
108. Id.
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through foreign investment protection. The way the link between treat-
ment and economic development has been made seems confusing and
could give rise to different interpretations. But the fact that the preamble
of the model BIT somehow makes reference to economic development
can very well be interpreted as an indication that the purpose of the par-
ties to the agreement was to protect foreign investments in order to at-
tract capital and foster economic development of the parties involved.
Taken from there, it could be argued that protection to some investments
should be denied whenever they are not beneficial for the economic de-
velopment of the recipient country.
F. LEGAL PERSONALITY OF SUBSIDIARIES
Economic development reasons are not considered to disregard the le-
gal personality of the subsidiary in order to ascertain the responsibility of
the parent company. Presently, under article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Con-
vention, the legal personality of a wholly owned subsidiary can be disre-
garded, but not for purposes of liability. 10 9 Accordingly, the purpose of
the Convention's article 25(2)(b) was to facilitate foreign investments
through locally incorporated companies so that they could qualify to pre-
sent claims at ICSID. Hence, when the parties to the Convention have
agreed to consider a local subsidiary as a foreign entity due to foreign
control, the legal personality is disregarded on behalf of international law
protection. Disregarding the personality of the local subsidiaries in order
to consider them as nationals of the parent company's country works well
for the interests of the investors who, by this means, would be entitled to
international law protection, even though the legal form of the subsidiary
is that of a domestic entity. But when the subsidiaries of foreign compa-
nies delve into activities that are inflammatory to the interests of the host
countries quite frequently, it is argued that those entities are independent
and separate, that they are incorporated in the host country and subject
to its laws and that responsibility for their acts should not be extended to
the parent company.
109. ICSID Convention, supra note 14, at art. 25.
(1) The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising
directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any con-
stituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the
Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting State, which
the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre.
When the parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its
consent unilaterally.
(2) "National of another Contracting State" means:
(b) any juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting
State other than the State party to the dispute on the date on which
the parties consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or arbitra-
tion and any juridical person which had the nationality of the Con-
tracting State party to the dispute on that date and which, because of
foreign control, the parties have agreed should be treated as a national
of another Contracting State for the purposes of this Convention.
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Thus, for the sake of balance, international investment law instruments
should also provide for circumstances when the personality of the subsidi-
ary should be disregarded in order to attain the parent company and
make it responsible for the actions of entities under its control. Arbitra-
tors should also consider that possibility when it is clear that the parent
company is dodging responsibility by arguing the separation of legal per-
sonalities. Doctrines such as that of representation, piercing the corpo-
rate veil and abus de droit,110 among others, could be of use to arbitral
tribunals willing to look beyond the corporate form.
G. IMPACT OF BITs
In real terms, the impact of international investment arbitration in
Latin America has been uncertain. Studies show that the relation be-
tween BITs and the flow of FDI is weak.1 1' Signing BITs and agreeing to
international investment arbitration does not guarantee that foreign in-
vestors will create business in a given country. At most, the international
investment law framework creates a positive investment climate, which
diminishes the risk associated with the transaction costs of doing business.
Added to the existence of a business opportunity, along with other busi-
ness related factors, this framework could move the investors to choose
that country as a location to invest. But more and more there are indica-
tions that the mere acceptance of international investment law is not suf-
ficient to attract foreign investments.
In Latin America, the largest recipient of FDI is Brazil.1 1 2 Of a total of
$67 billion of FDI inflow into Latin America in 2005, Brazil attracted
more than $18 billion."l 3 Yet, Brazil is not a signatory of the ICSID Con-
vention and has not ratified any BIT. Thus, the lack of adherence to the
international investment law has not affected Brazil's foreign investments
attractiveness.
On the other hand, international investment law might have a negative
impact in terms of local governance. Through BITs, for instance, foreign
investors may escape local courts and not play a role in the dynamic to
reform those institutions. In that sense, it has been argued that in some
developing countries already suffering from low-quality institutions, the
presence of international alternatives to adjudicatory or regulatory bod-
ies may reduce local institutional quality by not allowing strong political
110. BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 121 (1987).
111. See Jennifer Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Foreign Direct Investment and the
Business Environment in Developing Countries: The Impact of Bilateral Investment
Treaties (Yale Law Sch., Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Pub. Policy, Research Paper No.
293, 2005), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/outside/html/faculty/sroseack/
FDI_BITs-may02.pdf (last visited Jul. 20, 2006). See also Mary Hallward-
Dreimeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign Direct Investment?
Only a Bit. .and They Could Bite (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
Series, Paper No. 3121, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=636541.
112. UNCTAD World Investment Report 2005, supra note 1.
113. Id.
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coalitions to be formed." 14 Foreigners would have no interest in pressing
for changes in the judicial system, for instance, since they are subject to a
special dispute resolution regime.
It has also been said that BITs might reduce the interest of foreign
investors in property and enforcement reforms in developing countries.
Domestic reforms may be less likely and the country may even regress
toward policies that harm domestic investors. Attempts to reform may
fail, or no attempts to reform may be made at all. In such cases, the BIT,
although benefiting foreign investors, could have a negative effect on the
trustworthiness of the business environment for domestic investors.' 15
Obviously, BITs are not the cause of weak legal reforms or law en-
forcement in developing countries. But they might not be helpful on re-
form efforts or might even make things worse by opening a
discriminatory and unfair system of investment protection composed of
two paths: a strong international path for some foreign investors and a
weak domestic path for the rest of businesses and locals. More research
needs to be conducted to determine the impact of international invest-
ment law in local governance and legal reforms before a final judgment is
issued. For now, one should only say that doubt has been expressed con-
cerning the positive externalities the system of international investment
law brings to developing countries in general, and to Latin American
countries in particular.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Economic development needs to be financed. Historically, developing
countries have obtained that financing through the revenues yielded by
the sale of their commodities in international markets, through loans
granted either by international commercial banks or multilateral entities,
or through bilateral aid provided by the wealthy countries. Not until re-
cently have developing countries accepted the argument that foreign in-
vestments could be a means to finance economic development both
directly and indirectly through its positive externalities. 116 In the past,
foreign investments were either despised and rejected or heavily regu-
lated because they were considered instruments of neo-colonialism or
dominance.1 1 7
In the 1990s, Latin America countries began to favor public policies
favorable to foreign investment. As part of policies aimed at reducing the
size of the state and opening space for private investors, countries were
somehow convinced that legal reforms were needed. Amid those re-
forms, countries were supposed to enter into international agreements
114. Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaties and Governance, 25 INT'L REV. L. AND ECON 107 (2005).
115. See Tobin & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 111.
116. An example of positive externalities is seen in job creation and technology trans-
fer. See SANJAYA LALL & PAUL STREETEN, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, TRANSNA-
TIONALS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 5 (1977).
117. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 6.
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that would provide a sound, secure, and predictable investment climate
for foreign investors. Being signatory to the ICSID Convention and exe-
cuting BITs with capital exporting countries where investment arbitration
was consented were part of the package better known as the Washington
Consensus. 118
But although the Washington Consensus delivered some results, it
came under heavy criticism in the region mainly because those policies
failed to cure the endemic inequality of the western hemisphere, and
made the rich richer while the poor remained poor, if not poorer. Many
of the policies portrayed by the Washington Consensus came under scru-
tiny, and a shift of policies has been recommended.' 19 Under this scena-
rio, the rationale behind the international investment law could be
questioned. This should not be underestimated if one takes into account
that Latin America was the birthplace of the Calvo doctrine 120 and the
creative nationalization schemes during of the 1970s.121
If the good of foreign investments comes into doubt because it is not
beneficial to the economic development of the countries, the use of the
international investment law would inevitably be at risk. Countries could
start judging the pros and cons of the system and eventually reject their
outcomes by failing to comply, or more likely, by denouncing previous
commitments assumed under the form of international agreements or by
not entering into new instruments of international investment law.
In order to avoid this, the whole system of international investment
law, including international investment arbitration needs to be more bal-
anced. Arbitrators need to give more weight to considerations of eco-
nomic development in the context of their awards, whenever this is
feasible. For example, arbitrators need to look at the objective of inter-
national investment law in broad terms and find out the real purpose of
that legal framework: is it only to protect foreign investments or is it to
protect foreign investments because they are beneficial to the economic
development of the recipient country? If the purpose of the international
investment law is merely to protect foreign investments, the results of the
arbitrators' analysis would be totally different from an approach that also
considers the economic development of the host state.
But arbitrators can only look at the law as it exists, not how it should
exist. Thus, although arbitrators might be willing to make interpretations
118. See John Williamson, Did the Washington Consensus Fail?, INST. FOR INT'L
ECON.(Nov. 6, 2002) (outline of speech at the Center for Strategic & International
Studies), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?Research
ID=488 (last visited July 20, 2006).
119. Id.; see also After the Washington Consensus: Restarting Growth and Reform in
Latin America, INST. FOR INT'L ECON (Perro-Pablo Kuczyniski & John Williamson
eds., Mar. 2003), available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washing-
ton html.
120. See Gainer, supra note 9, at 1574.
121. See HARALD KNUDSEN, EXPROPRIATION OF FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENTS IN
LATIN AMERICA (1974). For instance Kennecott's copper mining was expropri-
ated in Chile in 1971 using the argument of excessive profits for not compensating.
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of the law when possible, and look at the purpose of the treaties and the
intention of the states, they cannot make up an objective that has not
been expressed by the parties to the agreement.
For this reason, the treaty negotiators should bear in mind that the law
is only as good as they make it. For countries harboring skepticism about
the benefits of international investment law in general, and of interna-
tional investment arbitration in particular, the importance of clearly stat-
ing their economic development objectives vis-A-vis foreign investment
cannot be underestimated.
Likewise, within the treaties, the impact of foreign investments on eco-
nomic development should expressly be made part of the criteria to be
taken into account by the arbitral tribunals when admitting a claim, up-
holding jurisdiction, and awarding monetary compensations.
Fairness and balance should be the rationale for these approaches. For
instance, there is a need to amend the practice whereby the legal person-
ality of the foreign investor can be disregarded for purposes of granting
international law protection to a host state incorporated subsidiary while
the same is not contemplated for purposes of liability of the parent com-
pany. The policy of granting international law protection to wholly
owned subsidiaries incorporated in the host state makes sense. But in
order for the foreign parent company to be liable for the actions of the
local subsidiary, the same criterion should be applied and under certain
circumstances, the personality of the local subsidiary should be disre-
garded. For that to be possible, negotiators should devise mechanisms to
be included in the relevant treaties.
International law of foreign investment has evolved to a point where it
is in need of change. So far this field of international law has generated a
good deal of treaties, jurisprudence, legal doctrines, and principles. But a
more balanced approach, inspired by a close examination of its roots, is
necessary if the international investment law approach is to survive.
